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violation of a right of way ordinance is negligence per se.2" Other juris-
dictions say that such ordinances impose upon the pedestrian a duty to
exercise greater care, or give rise to an obligation of continuous obser-
vation, but these courts insist that the driver is not relieved of his duty
to exercise due care for the safety of the offending pedestrian. 2' To hold
otherwise is to negative a clear intent that the ordinance "shall not
relieve the driver of a vehicle from the duty to exercise due care for
the safety of pedestrians," and to leave the pedestrian who has inad-
vertently invaded the vehicular right of way, without remedy against
the driver who negligently injures him, unless proximate cause be sub-
mitted to the jury and resolved in his favor. R. M. A.
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS - SUABILITY OF
LABOR UNIONS
In an action against an international unincorporated association of
railroad engineers by one of its members for damages resulting from a
claimed dereliction of duty of certain officers of the union, the court in
a dictum said that the association is suable if a proper foundation is laid,
basing its statement on the cases following United Mine Workers of
.merica v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 57o, 66 L.
Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762 (1922) and on Ohio G.C. sec. 11257.
McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 12 Ohio Op. III, 18 N.E. (2d) 812
(1938)-
The decision turned on another point, but the court's statement
raises the important question of the suability of voluntary associations
in general and unincorporated labor unions in particular. It is well
settled at common law that a voluntary association is not a legal entity
distinct from that of its members. Thus, at common law, an unincor-
porated labor union could not sue or be sued in its association name, but
every member of the labor union had to be made a party to the action.'
o'Koeppelv.Daluiso, Ia8 Cal. App. 44z, 5 P. (zd) 457 (293).
"2Ivy v. Marx, 2o5 Ala. 6o, 87 So. 813, 14 A.L.R. 1173 (gzo): "the ordinance
was certainly passed with a view to protect human life, and to give the ordinance a con-
struction which would sanction a relaxation of vigilance on the part of drivers of auto-
mobiles upon the public streets would run counter to its evident intent." Rhimer v. Davis,
sz6 Wash. 470, ziS Par. 193 (9zo); W. B. Bassett & Co. v. Ward, 246 Va. 654, 13Z
S.E. 700 (z926); Webb-Pepploe v. Cooper, '59 Md. 426, 151 At. 235 (2930); Saunders
v. Yellow Cab Co., 18z Minn. 62, 233 N.W. 599 (2930)
'Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas and Steam Fitters' and Helpers' Local 93, 238 Il. App.
123 (1925); Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933); WARREN, COR-
PORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPOrATION, (2929) pp. 667-8; Note (938) 26
Georgetown L. J. 999, 2o0-z; Note (2937) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 2035 27 A.L.R. 786
(2gz2); 2 Brit. Rul. Case 85z.
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In the absence of applicable statutes to the contrary, this is the general
rule today.2
However, the difficulty of designating an unincorporated association
as a party litigant in its common name is deemed to be only a formal
procedural defect by most of the authorities. If the objection of non-
suability of the group as a legal unit is not raised, it is deemed to be
waived.3 But it is difficult for the pleader to know upon what specific
ground to object, because there is a remarkable lack of uniformity as to
the precise nature of the defect.' And the courts have held that either
an association doing business as a legal entity, or one dealing with it as
such, may be estopped to deny the existence of the association.5
In equity, the difficulties involved in securing jurisdiction over an
unincorporated association were greatly alleviated by the development of
representative suits. By this technique, an action may be instituted by
or against a voluntary association where the members comprising the
same are numerous simply by joining as parties to the suit some natural
persons, members of the organization, sufficient to represent and protect
the interests of the entire membership.' But it is no more permissible
2 Baskins v. United Mine Workers of America, i5o Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (192);
Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 25 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (I933)5 Ruggles v. Inter-
national Ass'n., etc., Iron Workers, 331 Mo. 20, 52 S.W. (zd) 86o (2932); O'lay
Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, x95 S.E. 564. (2938)i Sturgis, Unincorporated Asso-
ciations As Parties to Actions (2924) 33 Yale L.J. 383i Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev.
454; Note (1938) 4 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 233i 27 A.L.R. 786 (2922)5 2 L.R.A. (N.S.)
788( 1905).
It is submitted that the conclusion reached in Note (2937) 3 O.S.L.J. 237, 242,
that "The weight of authority in those states in which there is no relevant statute seems
to consider a labor union to be a proper subject of suit" is erroneous. Michaels v. Hill-
man, 12 Misc. 395, 183 N.Y.S. 295 (292o) and Clarkson V. Laiblan, 202 Mo. App.
68z, 226 S.W. xo29 (2929) are cited to support this conclusion. In New York at the
time that Michaels v. Hillman was decided, there was a relevant statute. Schouten v.
Alpine, 2x5 N.Y. 225, 2o9 N.E. z44 (r9 ). The action in Clarkson v. Laiblan was
agaimt the officers and members of the union rather than against the union itself.
' United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605, 267 S.-W. 891 (2924);
Jardine v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 213 Cal. 302, 307-8; 2 Pac.
(2d) 756, 759, 79 AL.R. 29x (1932)5 Franklin Union No. 4 v. The People, z2o II.
35, 364, 77 N.E. 176, 279, 22o Am. St. Rep. 248, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) oox (I9O6); Iron
Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 92 C.C.A. 632, x66 Fed. 49, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.)
315 (i9O8); Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers' International Ass'n. V. Case,
93 Fed. (2d) 56 (1937); STURo, op. cit.- pp. 388-9i WARREN, op. cit., pp. 663-45
27 A.L.R. 786, 790 (2922).
STURGEs, op. cit., p. 389.
'Clark v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084,
43 S.E. (zd) 404, 88 A.L.R. 250 (1931); Petty v. Brunswick and TV. Ry. Co., 2o9 Ga.
666, 1; S.E. 8z (29oo).
Newark International Baseball Club v. Theatrical M., A. and T. Union, 225 N. J.
Eq. 575, 7 AtI. (zd) 170 (2939); Aalco Laundry & C. Co. v. Laundry Linen, etc., Union
Local No. 366, 115 S.W. (2d) 89 (Mo. 2938); Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee,
333 IlL 225, 264 N.E. 393, 63 A.L.R. 257 (2928); WARRN, op. cit., pp. 42-3, 668-9i
Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 454i x Brit. Rul. Case. 852, 854.
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in equity than at law to bring a suit against an unincorporated labor
union as a legal unit.'
In the federal courts it has been well established that a labor union
has a personality capable of being sued ever since the leading case United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., supra.8 In an opin-
ion by Chief Justice Taft, the court took cognizance of the fact that
the growth and necessities of great labor organizations have brought
affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and held
that a national unincorporated labor union and its district and local
branches, having been recognized as distinct entities by numerous acts
of Congress, as well as by the laws and decisions of many states, are
suable as such in the federal courts upon process served on their prin-
cipal officers. Professor Warren, however, does not think that the
court declined to follow the common law rule. Nor does he think that
there is anything in the opinion which justifies the conclusion that, if
there had been no sec. 8 of the Sherman Act or other pertinent statutes,
the court would nevertheless have sanctioned a suit against the unincor-
porated labor unions upon objection properly taken as to their status.'
The rule enunciated in the Coronado Coal Co. case has its limitations,
however, in that the federal courts have refused to endow unincor-
porated labor unions with the attributes of citizenship apart and separate
from its members for making out diversity of citizenship. The actual
citizenship of its members determines the citizenship of an unincor-
porated labor union for purposes of federal jurisdiction."0
Let us now examine the law on unincorporated associations in Ohio.
The statute most directly applicable in Ohio is G.C. sec. 11257. It
provides: "When the question is one of a common or general interest
of many persons, or the parties are very numerous, and is impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all."
The statute is an enactment of the equitable principle of virtual
'Equity differs from the common law only in that it may be sufficient to have before
the court only some of those who would have been necessary parties if the proceeding had
been at law. Pickett v. Walsh, 19z Mass. S72, 589, 78 N.E. 753, 76o, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.)
io67, 1o81, 7 Ann. Cas. 638, 645, ic6 Am. St. Rep. 272 (19o6); WARREN, op. Cit., p.669. 6 Subsequent federal cases accepting and following the Coronado Coal Co. case:
Christian v. International Assns of Machinistsi 7 Fed. (2d) 481 (1925); Dean V. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n., 17 Fed. Supp. 748 (1936). See Note (1937) 1Z Wis-
L. Rev. 523.
' WARRFN, op. cit, pp. 661-4. But see Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of
Associations (929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1003.
° Rassell v. Central Labor Union, i Fed. (2d) 412 (1924), Gaunt v. Lloyds
America of San Antonio, ii Fed. Supp. 787 (1935) ; Rosendale v. Phillips, 87 Fed. (2d)
4S4 (1937); Ex parte Edelstein, 30 Fed. (2d) 636 (1929) noted in (1929) 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 1079; Note (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 363.
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representation. The question then arises as to whether the statute is
merely confirmatory and only applicable to suits equitable in nature or
whether it was intended to apply to actions at law as well. Professor
Warren in his book" lists 26 states besides Ohio which have a statute
similar to G.C. sec. 11257. In some states the statute would seem to
be merely confirmatory. For example, in Georgia the statute is con-
tained in a chapter entitled "Parties to Equitable Proceedings."" How-
ever, in Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893), to
the argument that the statute was restricted to equitable proceedings,
the court said (pp. 711-12): "One object of the code in abolishing the
distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and prescribing
the same method of procedure for the prosecution of both, evidently
was to simplify judicial proceedings, and facilitate the administration of
justice; and to accomplish that end, its provisions, and proceedings under
them, should receive the liberal construction which it expressly required
shall be given them. To restrain the application of section 5oo8 (now
G.C. sec. I 1257), to actions of a purely equitable nature, would, we
think, be at variance with its language, and the general spirit and pur-
poses of the code." The court, therefore, held that the statute applied
to actions of a legal, as well as to those of an equitable, nature. It is
Professor Warren's opinion that in the majority of the states in which
such a statute has been passed it was the legislative intent that the
statute should apply at law as well as in equity.' 3
It has been uniformly held by the courts in Ohio that an unincor-
porated labor union falls within the provisions of G.C. sec. 11257.
However, most of the cases involving it have arisen in litigation that
would have been within the jurisdiction of the equity court prior to the
Code, such as injunction cases 4 and receiverships. 5 The cases in which
the statute has been invoked to enable an unincorporated association to
sue or be sued in actions involving purely legal questions are few. It
has been held that an unincorporated association can take advantage of
the statute to sue for damages in tort actions 16 and actions for breach
of contract." It seems to be well settled that a member of an unincor-
porated association can not sue it for damages suffered by him as a
" WRRFN, op. Cit., p. 543-
'-'Georgia, Code, 1932, sec. 5415.
SVARMN:, Op. Cit., p. 544.
"Hillenbrand v. Building Trades Council, x4 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 6zS, Hosea, 327
(19o;); Statler Co. v. Employee? Alliance, i9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 375, 27 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 17S (1914); Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
193 (1922).
" Kcaly v. Faulkner, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 49, x8 Ohio Dec. (N.S.) 498 (1907).
'"Platt v. Colvin, go Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893).
" Kinney v. Pocock, 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 121, 19 Ohio Dec. 354 (1908)-
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member.' 8 But there seems to be a scarcity of dear authority either
way in Ohio on the question whether an unincorporated association can
be sued by a non-member in a tort action for damages caused by
members of the association.'" The only reported case directly applicable
seems to be Kiser v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 4 Ohio L. Abs.
55 (1925). This case has a very interesting history. In the first report
of the case (24 Ohio L. Rep. 144, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 594), both 24 Ohio
L. Rep. 144 and 3 Ohio L. Abs. 594 have in their headnotes that a
member of a local branch of a national labor union, who is denied
employment in violation of its constitution by the officers of the local
branch although they had opportunity to provide employment, has an
action for damages against the officers and local branch. However, the
reported opinion in 24 Ohio L. Rep. 144 said, "The principal question
then is, assuming the facts of the petition to be true, may the plaintiff
claim damages in an action at law against the officers of the local labor
union" (italics added). The opinion then quotes extensively from Local
Union No. 65 of The .Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Interna-
tional Alliance v. Nalty, 7 Fed. (2d) 100 (1925). This case is au-
thority for the rule given in the headnotes, but as it has been pointed
out, the rule in the federal courts is different from the general rule.
As reported in 4 Ohio L. Abs. 55, a motion was made to quash the
action on the plea that the local was an unincorporated association and
not a legal entity and therefor could not be sued. In an abstracted
opinion the court held that an unincorporated labor union can be sued
as such and service may be had upon it through its officers, citing Hillen-
brand v. Building Trades Council, 14 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 628, Hosea,
327 (1904) as authority. In an appeal to the Court of Appeals for
Hamilton County, the court discussed plaintiff's demurrer to one of the
defenses of defendant on the ground that it did not state a defense to
the action, said that such a demurrer searches the record, and held that
"This was the holding in the principal case. Mclees v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 12 Ohio Op. iii, IS N.E.
(zd) 812 (1938). See also Koogler v. Koogler, I27 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (5933);
McCann v. Local Union No. 476, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers
of America, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 385 (1938).
" It is submitted that the concusion in Note (1937) 3 0.S.L.J. 237, 24z that "it
would appear in this state (Ohio) the employer could maintain an action for damage3
against the labor union instigating a sit-down strike" is based on doubtful authority.
Parker v. Bricklayers' Union No. z, io Ohio Dec. Rep. 458, 21 ,Vkly. L. Bull. 223
(1889) and Kiser v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 24 Ohio L. Rep. s44, 3 Ohio L.
Abs. 594 (1925) on second hearing 4 Ohio L. Abs. sS (1925) are cited to support this
conclusion. In Moores and Co. v. Bricklayers' Union No. z, so Ohio Dec. Rep. 665, 675,
23 Wkly. L. Bull. 48, 54 (189o) which arose out of the same cause of action and involved
the same defendant as in Parker v. Bricklayers Union No. Z, supra, it was indicated that
the Bricklayers' Union No. s was a corporation. Kiser v. Motion Picture Operators
Union, supra, is discussed in the body of this note.
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plaintiff's petition charging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of advan-
tages of membership in the union without alleging facts or acts of
conspiracy does not state a cause of action. There was no discussion
on the suability of an unincorporated labor union for damages. 26 Ohio
App. 284, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 4, 159 N.E. 494 (1927)-
Hillcnbrand v. Building Trades Council, supra, is a case frequently
quoted. Although it was a suit for an injunction, the court delivered
a rather extensive opinion on the suability of unincorporated labor unions.
The court held that an injunction would lie against an unincorporated
labor union, in its own name, when sued together with one or more
of its members individually, upon whom service might be had in their
representative capacity, and that such an injunction would be binding
upon the body as an entity, and against all the members, whether or
not they were directly represented.
However, the same court that decided Hlillenbrand v. Building
Trades Council, supra, in a later case involving an injunction had this
to say about that case :21 "We regret to say that we find ourselves
differing from the learned judge who decided that case, not so much
as to the law which is therein expressed, as with the practical results
which must necessarily follow the rule which he adopted. An action
for an injunction is a proceeding in personam, and we do not believe
that the court has the moral right to lay its restraining hand upon one
who may never have heard of the controversy which is before the court,
who may never have participated in the acts which are the object of
its animadversion, and who has had no opportunity to defend himself
against the imputation which would thus be made to rest upon him.
. . . Of course, these men and women who are aware of the injunc-
tion will necessarily be controlled thereby, and they will not violate the
writ except at their peril, but the injunction will actually issue only as
to those who are made parties."
Serious difficulties would arise if an attempt were made to apply
a statute like Ohio G.C. sec. 11257, without the aid of other statutes,
when an unincorporated association is sued for damages. The very
words of the statute indicate that it contemplates a representative suit
rather than an action binding a group as a unit. Ordinarily, a judgment
for the plaintiff in an action at law establishes a personal liability for
the entire amount of the verdict against every defendant. It would
naturally follow that if service on the members of a group in a repre-
sentative action were treated as bringing all the individual members
before the court, the judgment would determine the personal liability
-" Ffworth Garmcnt Co. v. Workcrs Union, 27 Ohio Dec. 675, 687, 15 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 353, 365 (1913).
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of all. Yet legislative attempts to provide for such judgments have been
invalidated as violating the due process clause. 2'
Moreover, it has been uniformly held under Ohio G.C. sec. 11257
that, in order for one to maintain a suit for the benefit of himself and
others, there must be community of interest as well as a right of recovery
by reason of the same essential facts.22 Applying this rule in its converse
form, some serious difficulties would arise with regard to community
of interest as to those members who sanctioned the association's activity
that resulted in its liability, those who did not participate either way,
and those who openly disapproved of the union's activity. Also, since
most of the members were not parties to the action while judgment was
being rendered against them, such a result would seem manifestly
unfair. In this case Ohio G.C. sec. I 1256 could probably be invoked.
This statute provides: "Parties who are united in interest must be
joined, as plaintiffs or defendants." The situation could be compared
to that in Umstead v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113 (1866) where a judg-
ment creditor of an insolvent corporation sought to hold several stock-
holders for their statutory liability. The court said (p. 118): "The
liability of the stockholders is several in nature, . . . and the stock-
holders, whose liability is sought to be enforced, have the right to insist
on their co-stockholders being made parties for the purpose of a general
account, and to enforce from them contribution in proportion to their
shares of stock."
It could even be argued that a judgment for damages against an
unincorporated labor union on the sole basis of Ohio G.C. sec. 11257
could not be enforced against the union's treasury. 2 ' The treasury
funds belong to the members of the union as a group while the statute
affects the members of the union as individuals. The members of the
union who could not be held personally liable on the judgment could
object to their interest in the union's funds being subject to the judg-
ment. Ohio G.C. sec. I 26o would not apply, because it is expressly
restricted to partnerships.
The decisions in other states where the question has arisen are by
no means uniform. In Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N. C. 505, 120 S.E.
57 (1923) noted in (1932) IO N.C.L. Rev. 313, it was held that a
statute similar to Ohio G.C. sec. 11257 would merely permit repre-
2'D'Arcy v. Ketchum, Sz U.S. x6S, 13 L. Ed. 648 (i851). See also Hall v. Lan-
hing, 91 U. S. 16o, 23 L. Ed. Z71 (875); Goldey v. Morning News, iS6 U. S. 5S8,
39 L. Ed. 517, 15 S.Ct. 559 (i89S); Dodd, op. cit., pp. 999-1ooo. But see Elliott v
Greer Presbyterian Church, 18i S. C. 84, x86 S.E. 651 (1936).
22Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 154, 73 N.E. ioS8, io6
Am. St. Rep. 586 (19o5)j Polatsek v. Union Trust Co., z Ohio L. Abs. 294 (1936).
22, See editorial (1898) 40 Wkly. L. Bull. 245.
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sentative suits by and against unincorporated associations at the option
of the association.2" However, in Branson v. Industrial Workers of the
World, 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (19o8) seemingly on the sole basis
of a statute similar to Ohio G.C. sec. 11257 the court held that an
unincorporated labor union could be sued for damages by a non-member
and that the funds of the union were subject to execution on the judg-
ment. The court said (p. 288), "While a voluntary unincorporated
association cannot by its name alone sue or be sued, nevertheless, such
an organization has its rights and responsibilities, which rights it may
enforce by appropriate procedure; and, by the same procedure, it nec-
essarily follows, it may be held accountable for its responsibilities. These
organizations usually comprise a large membership, and are governed in
accordance with prescribed rules and regulations by officers elected for
the purpose. They frequently not only possess a large amount of prop-
erty, but exercise vast powers in the communities in which they exist.
It is conceded that they may sue or be sued by joining all their members,
but this, if requisite, would impose great inconvenience upon the organi-
zations themselves, as well as hardship upon those seeking redress against
such organizations, for it would be impossible, in many instances, for
non-members to obtain the names of more than a small fraction of the
membership, without great effort, delay, and probable expense ...
To hold that the defendant organizations (unincorporated labor un-
ions) cannot be sued without including all members, which are so
numerous, scattered and difficult to ascertain might cause such hardship
and delay as would amount to a denial of justice."2 It seems then that
the court in Branson v. Industrial Vorkers of the World, supra, made
an entity out of an unincorporated labor union at least for procedural
purposes.
Let us now examine the other applicable statutes in Ohio to deter-
mine whether the same line of reasoning used in the Coronado Coal Co.
case, supra, can be applied in Ohio. As early as 1904 Hillenbrand v.
Building Trades Council, supra, used the following language (p. 649)
"Labor unions have been recognized by law in Ohio as entities capable
of exercising the rights of individuals, as in the trade union acts of Great
Britain. Thus, by See. 4364-49 Rev. Stat. (now G.C. sec. 13102)
they are authorized to adopt and possess a trade-mark label in the union
name, which name may be registered as such with the secretary of
state. (Section 4364-51 [now G.C. sec. 6219]). They may sue to
"a See Operative Plastcrers and Cement Finishers' International Ass'n v. Case, 93
Fed. (zd) 56, 59 (1937) for a discussion on this case.
'" This case is followed by St. GCermain v. Bakery and Confectionary Workers Union,
No. 9, 97 Wash. z82, 166 Pac. 66S (1917), which in turn is followed by Labonite v. Can-
ner Workcrs' and Fars Laborers, Unon, 197 Wash. S43, 86 Pac. (2d) I89 (938).
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enjoin the unauthorized use of such labels. (Section 4364-53 [now
G.C. sec. 6223]); or to recover the penalty (Sec. 4364-53a [sic] 25
[now G.C. sec. 6226]; and, where unincorporated, may, by special
statute, sue by an officer or member for the benefit of all (Sec. 4364-53a
Rev. State. [now G.C. sec. 6225], which recognizes the application of
the equity rule. Indeed the legislature has attempted to make it unlawful
to prevent men from joining labor unions or to discharge from employ-
ment because of such membership. Section 4364-68 Rev. Stat. (later
G.C. sec. 12943 which was repealed in 1929.2")."
The above quotation sounds remarkably similar to the language used
in the Coronado Coal Co. case, supra, and in fact Hillenbrand v. Build-
ing Trades Council, supra, is quoted in the Coronado Coal Co. case."
Other statutes in Ohio provide for penalties for the fraudulent filing2"
and the unauthorized use2 1 of a labor union label or trade-mark. An-
other statute penalizes the unauthorized wearing of a badge or button
of a labor union." Thus it is apparent that the existence of labor unions
has been given affirmative legal recognition by several statutes in Ohio.
It would seem possible, then, to use the same line of reasoning in Ohio
as was used in the Coronado Coal Co. case, supra. That this will prob-
ably be the result seems to be indicated by the favorable reception of the
federal rule in the Ohio cases.3 This is undoubtedly the desirable result.
There seems to be no sound reason why an unincorporated labor union
should not be liable as such for its acts and its funds be subject to execu-
tion on such judgment. To the average layman the distinction between
a corporation and an unincorporated labor union as suable entities is
not apparent. It might be technically true that the property of an
2' This is probably a misprint. Section 4364-53c seems to be the section to which
the court was referring.
"This statute was held unconstitutional. Jackson v. Berger, 9z Ohio St. 130, 110
N.E. 732 (915); State v. La Monte Bateman, 7 Ohio N.P. 4 S7, so Ohio Dec. 63(sgoo); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. s, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, L.R.A. sgis C,
96o (194). In 1931 Ohio G.C. sec. 624x-z was enacted. This section provides: "Every
undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether written or oral, express or implied, con-
stituting, or contained in, any contract or agreement of hiring or employment between
any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation, and any employee or pros-
pective employee of the same, whereby (a) either party to such contract or agreement
undertakes or promises not to join, become, or remain, a member of any labor organiza-
tion or of any organization of employers, or (b) either party to such contract or agreement
undertakes or promises that he will withdraw from the employment relation in the event
that he joins, becomes, remains, a member of any labor organization or of any organiza-
tion of employers, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and wholly void."'
2 259 U. S. 344, 390.
-s Ohio G.C. sec. 13153.
29 Ohio G.C. sec. 13154 and 1315.
'0 Ohio G.C., sec. 13163.
n' McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 59 Ohio
App. 477, zz Ohio Op. 111, 18 N.E. (2d) 8Szz (1938); Kiser v. Motion Picture Oper
ators' Union, 24 Ohio L. Rep. 144, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 594 (gzS).
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unincorporated labor union is in the members as individuals and not
in the group as an entity, but the title is only a restricted title and carries
with it no right to possess the property for other than group purposes."
In all fairness, then, it would seem that the property should also be held
liable for the union's acts.
In early times the common law rule on suability of unincorporated
associations probably worked no serious harm. Associations were small
in membership, and their creditors or other plaintiffs had reasonable
opportunity to know or ascertain an entire membership. However, in
modern times the fact that unincorporated associations such as labor
unions frequently possess large and scattered memberships has made it
next to impossible for plaintiffs to ascertain, with any degree of certainty,
the names of all the constituent individuals who are made necessary
defendants by operation of the common law rule. Moreover, when the
membership of the labor union runs into the hundreds of thousands, the
requirement that each member of the union be made a party would
result in enormous cost and inconvenience. It frequently happens when
labor unions become large that they possess some funds in their treas-
ury. When this is so, the, ordinary plaintiff suing such unions for
damages is more interested in reaching the funds in the union's treasury
than acquiring a judgment against the individual members.
One solution of this problem would be the incorporation of labor
unions. This question has been vigorously debated for many years,33
but although many states permit labor unions to incorporate, relatively
few unions take advantage of incorporation.34 When the statute so
permits it, the right of the union to incorporate can not be questioned
by the incorporation official."
However, incorporation is what the labor unions have been trying
to avoid.3" In fact recent legislation seems to be aimed at making incor-
poration of labor unions impossible. In Illinois it has been held that the
1937 amendment to its Not-For-Profit Corporation Act precluded
labor unions from incorporating. Ohio in 1935 enacted an amend-
ment to the General Corporation Act affecting corporations not for
Dodd, op. cit., p. 993.
' Labor unions should incorporate. Brandeis, The Incorporation of Trade Unions
(1903) 15 Green Bag Ii. Incorporation would not remedy evils of labor unions. Wam-
baugh, Should Trade Unions Be Incorporated? (1903) 5 Green Bag z6o; Walter, In-
corporation of Labor Unions (i9o6) 68 Aib. L.J. 68. See also Latham, Federal Regula-
tion of Collective Bargaining (1937) 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. x, io; Boyd, The Case for
Regulation of Labor Unions in the United States (937) Z4 Va. L. Rev. 103, IZI.
2' Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 454, n. z.
"
1Hagan v. Picard, 171 Misc. 475, iz N.Y.S. (zd) 873 (x939).
"s Roberts, Labor Unions, Corporations-The Coronado Case (19z3) 5 Il1. L. Quart.
200.
27 People v. Hughes, 296 Ill. App. 587, x6 N.E. (zd) 922 (1938).
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profit which provides in part:" "The secretary of state shall not file any
articles of incorporation wherein the name includes the word 'union,'
or the words 'labor union,' or like words expressed in a foreign lan-
guage." Although the purpose for which this statute was intended to
be enacted is not entirely clear, it would seem, by implication, to pre-
clude the incorporation of labor unions in Ohio.
Other states have removed the procedural obstacles in the way of
suit against unincorporated labor unions by express statute. In a note
in (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 454, 456 there is a list of i9 states which
have statutes to this effect. Under these statutes the common law
conception of unincorporated associations has been altered to the extent
of permitting a suit in the name of the union, service on union officers
and execution against union funds. The action in essence is still one
against the individual members; but the union funds can be reached,
and the members' individual property is not subject to execution where
the action is against the union.4" The courts have uniformly upheld the
validity of such statutes. 4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina even
upheld a statute providing that an unincorporated association might be
sued without naming the individual members, by service on the agent
of the association, and that an individual member's property is liable
for satisfaction of the judgment against the association.42 It is submitted
that the statute to the extent that it binds the members not made parties
to the suit goes too far.
Although in Ohio it would seem possible to sue an unincorporated
labor union for damages under its present statutes, it is submitted that
the best solution of this problem would be to enact statutes expressly
covering the situation. The statutes of New York43 are submitted as
an example of the type of statutes which would adequately cover the
situation. Pertinent parts of these statutes are as follows:
"Section 12. An action or special proceeding may be maintained,
by the president or treasurer of an unincorporated association to recover
any property, or upon any cause of action, for or upon which all the
associates may maintain such an action or special proceeding, by reason
of their interest or ownership therein, either jointly or in common. An
so Ohio G.C. sec. 86z3-98.
"Schouten v. Alpine, 2s5 N. Y. 225, 3o9 N.E. 244 (393S)5 Meinhart v. Contresta,
z94. N.Y.S. 593 (92z2)•
"'Jardine v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 23 Cal. 301, 2 Pac.
(zd) 756, 79 A.L.R. 291 (931) and note5 Grand International Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers v. Green, 23o Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); United States Heater Co.
v. Iron Moulders Union, 129 Mich. 354, 88 N.W. 889 (igoz)5 Bobe v. Lloyds, xo Fed.
(zd) 730 (3926).
'2 Elliott v. Greer Presbyterian Church, 1S1 S. C. 84, x86 S.E. 651 (1936).
"' N. Y. Gen. Ass'n. Law (Cahill, 1935) C. 20, sections 32 to 17.
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action may likewise be maintained by such president or treasurer to
recover from one or more members of such association his or their
proportionate share of any moneys lawfully expended by such association
for the benefit of such associates, or to enforce any lawful claim of such
association against such member or members.
"Section 13. An action or special proceeding may be maintained,
against the president or treasurer of such an association, to recover any
property, or upon any cause of action, for or upon which the plaintiff
may maintain such an action or special proceeding, against all the asso-
ciates, by reason of their interest or ownership, or claim of ownership
therein, either jointly or in common, or their liability therefor, either
jointly or severally. ...
"Section 15. In such an action, the oficer against whom it is
brought cannot be arrested; and a judgment against him does not
authorize an execution to be issued against his property, or his person;
nor does the docketing thereof bind his real property, or chattels real.
Where such a judgment is for a sum of money, an execution issued
thereupon must require the sheriff to satisfy the same, out of any per-
sonal or real property belonging to the association, or owned, jointly or
in common, by all the members thereof.
"Section 17. This article does not prevent an action from being
brought by or against all the members of an association, except as pre-
scribed in the last section. .... .
J.J.L.

